In this paper, we propose a round efficient unconditionally secure multiparty computation (UMPC) protocol in information theoretic model with n > 2t players, in the absence of any physical broadcast channel, which communicates O(n 4 ) field elements per multiplication and requires O(n log(n) + D) rounds, even if up to t players are under the control of an active adversary having unbounded computing power. In the absence of a physical broadcast channel and with n > 2t players, the best known UMPC protocol with minimum number of rounds, requires O(n 2 D) rounds and communicates O(n 6 ) field elements per multiplication, where D denotes the multiplicative depth of the circuit representing the function to be computed securely. On the other hand, the best known UMPC protocol with minimum communication complexity requires communication overhead of O(n 2 ) field elements per multiplication, but has a round complexity of O(n 3 + D) rounds. Hence our UMPC protocol is the most round efficient protocol so far and ranks second according to communication complexity. To design our protocol, we use certain new techniques which are of independent interest.
Introduction
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC): Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of n players to securely compute an agreed function, even if up to t players are under the control of a centralized adversary. More specifically, assume that the desired functionality can be specified by a function f : ({0, 1} * ) n → ({0, 1} * ) n and player P i has input x i ∈ {0, 1} * . At the end of the computation of f , P i gets y i ∈ {0, 1} * , where (y 1 , . . . , y n ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ). The function f has to be computed securely using a protocol where at the end of the protocol all players (honest) receive correct outputs and the messages seen by the adversary during the protocol contain no additional information about the inputs and outputs of the honest players, other than what can be computed from the inputs and outputs of the corrupted players. In the information theoretic model, the adversary who actively controls at most t players, is adaptive, rushing [11] and has unbounded computing power. The function to be computed is represented as an arithmetic circuit over a finite field F consisting of five type of gates, namely addition, multiplication, random, input and output. A MPC protocol securely evaluates the circuit gate-by-gate [5, 22, 2, 22, 17, 19, 4] .
The MPC problem was first defined and solved by Yao [23] in his seminal work in two-party scenario. The first generic solutions presented in [16, 9, 14] were based on cryptographic intractibility assumtions. Later, the research on MPC in information theoretic model was initiated by Ben-Or et. al. [5] and Chaum et. al. [8] in two different independent work and carried forward by the works of [22, 2] . Information theoretic security can be achieved by MPC protocols in two flavors -(a) Perfect: The outcome of the protocol is perfect in the sense that no probability of error is involved in the computation of the function (b) Unconditional: The outcome of the protocol is correct except with negligible error probability. While Perfect MPC can be achieved iff t < n/3 [5] , unconditional MPC (UMPC) requires only honest majority i.e t < n/2 [22] . In the recent years, lot of research concentrated on designing communication efficient protocols for both perfect and unconditional MPC. Perfect MPC protocols with optimal resilience i.e t < n/3 are presented in [17, 19, 4] . UMPC protocols with non-optimal resilience i.e t < n/3 are presented in [18, 12] . Finally, UMPC protocols with optimal resilience i.e t < n/2 are presented in [11, 3] .
Broadcast: Broadcast is a very important primitive and is heavily used in all MPC and UMPC protocols. Broadcast allows a sender to distribute a value x, such that all the players identically receive the same value x (even if the sender is faulty). If a physical broadcast channel is available in the network, then achieving broadcast is very trivial. In such a case, broadcasting bits requires single round and exactly bits of communication. But if the broadcast channel is not physically available in the network, then broadcasting an bit(s) message can be simulated by executing some protocol. In particular, for perfectly (without any error probability) broadcasting bits, the protocol presented in [6, 7] communicates Ω(n 2 ) bits and requires Ω(n) rounds with t < n/3. For unconditionally (with negligible error probability) broadcasting bits, the protocol presented in [21] communicates Ω(n 2 + n 6 κ) bits and requires Ω(n) rounds with t < n/2 on the availability of information theoretic PKI setup (information theoretic pseudo-signature), where κ is the error parameter. Recently Fitzi et. al. [13] have proposed multi-valued broadcast where broadcast of bits requires communication of O( n + nB(n + κ)) bits, provided there exists a broadcast protocol which communicates B(b) bits for broadcasting a b bit message where b < . Thus using the broadcast protocol of [21] as black-box, broadcast protocol of [13] communicates O(n + n 7 κ) for broadcasting an bit message and requires Ω(n) rounds of communication, where t <
Reference
Type? Resilience Brodcast Protocol Communication Complexity Round Complexity [11] Unconditional t < n/2 [13] O((cM n 6 + n 7 )κ) O(n 2 D) [17] Perfect t < n/3 [6, 7] O((c M n 3 + n 4 )κ) O(n 2 + D) [3] Unconditional t < n/2 [13] 
not to sacrifice one parameter for the other. So it is very essential to design protocol which balances both the parameters appropriately. Motivated by this, in this work we design an UMPC protocol which achieves efficiency in both the parameters simultaneously.
Our Network Model: We denote the set of n = 2t + 1 players (parties) involved in the secure computation by P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } where player P i possesses c i input values. We assume that all the n players are connected with each other by pairwise secure channels, as assumed in generic UMPC protocols [3, 11, 22] . Moreover, the system is synchronous and the protocols proceed in rounds, where in each round a player performs some computations, sends (broadcasts) values to its neighbors (everybody), receives values from neighbors and may again perform some more computation, in that order. The function to be computed is specified as an arithmetic circuit over a finite field F with input, addition, multiplication, random and output gates. We denote the number of gates of each type by c I , c A , c M , c R and c O , respectively. Note that c I = n i=1 c i . We model the distrust in the system by a centralized adversary A t , who has unbounded computing power and can actively control at most t players during the protocol execution, where t < n 2 . To actively control a player means to take full control over it and making it behave arbitrarily. The adversary is adaptive [11] and hence can corrupt players dynamically during the protocol execution. Moreover, the choice of the adversary to corrupt a player may depend upon the data seen so far from the corrupted players. Moreover, the adversary is a rushing adversary [15] , who in a particular round, first collects all the messages addressed to the corrupted players and exploits this information to decide on what the corrupted players send during the same round. If a player comes under the control of A t , then it remains so throughout the protocol. A player which is not under the control of A t is called honest or uncorrupted. We define two sets C and P where at any point of time C denotes the set of corrupted players identified so far and P = P \ C. Initially, P = P and C = ∅. As the protocol proceeds, some players will be detected as corrupted and will be added to C and removed from P . We denote the number of players in P by n which is initially equal to n. The number of players which can be still corrupted from P is denoted by t where t = t − |C|. Note that n will always maintain the following: n ≥ t + 1 + t ≥ 2t + 1 since t ≥ t . Also at any point of time P = P ∪ C.
Our protocol provides unconditional security i.e. information theoretic security with a negligible error probability of 2 −O(κ) for some security parameter κ. To achieve this error probability, all our computation are done over a finite field F = GF (2 κ ). Thus each field element can be represented by κ bits. Notice that, we also assume that n is polynomial in κ. For the ease of exposition, we always assume that the messages sent through the channels are from the specified domain. Thus if a player receives a message which is not from the specified domain (or no message at all), he replaces it with some pre-defined default message from the specified domain.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we propose a new UMPC protocol which communicates O(n 4 ) field elements per multiplication and requires O(n log(n) + D) rounds over a point-to-point network (in the absence of physical broadcast channel) with n = 2t+1 players. This result is to be compared with the UMPC protocol of [11] which provides so far best known round complexity of O(n 2 D) (and communicates O(n 6 ) field elements per multiplication) and with UMPC protocol of [3] which achieves the best known communication complexity of O(n 2 ) field elements per multiplication (but consumes O(n 3 + D) rounds). Hence our protocol is the most round efficient protocol so far and ranks second according to communication complexity. We introduce a new technique called Rapid Player Elimination (RPE) which is used in the preprocessing stage of our proposed UMPC protocol. Loosely speaking, RPE works as follows: The preprocessing stage of our UMPC protocol may fail several times due to the (mis)behavior of certain number of corrupted players whose corruptions are identified. RPE creates a win-win situation, where the adversary must reveal the identities of 2 i new corrupted players at the i th step. Otherwise, the preprocessing stage will not fail. Thus RPE ensures that preprocessing stage may fail at most log(t) times.
2 Unconditionally Secure MPC Protocol with n = 2t + 1
In this section, we present an UMPC protocol with n = 2t + 1. Prior to that we present a number of sub-protocols each solving a specific task. Some of the sub-protocols are based on few existing techniques while some are proposed by us for the first time. We describe all our subprotocols in the following settings: P denotes the set of players involved in the execution of the sub-protocols where |P | = n , the number of corrupted players present in P is t and n = t + 1 + t . During the execution of the sub-protocols, some more corrupted players may be detected as faulty and wil be removed from P . Accordingly n and t will change (without affecting the equality n = t + 1 + t ). Thus it is clear that at any stage P will always contain all the t + 1 honest players. For simplicity, we assume that P always contains the first n players (P 1 , . . . , P n ) from the set P. For convenience, we provide analysis of the communication and round complexities of our subprotocols and protocols assuming that physical broadcast channel is available in the system. At the end we give the complete communication and round complexity figure for our general multiparty computation protocol, assuming that the broadcast has to be simulated by protocol of [13] . Notice that a physical broadcast channel enables all the players from P to receive the broadcasted message. Since our sub-protocols are executed among the players in P and P ⊆ P, a broadcast step in our sub-protocol should allow only the players of P to get the broadcasted information. But notice that all the broadcast steps will be finally replaced by protocols (say from [13] ) where only players from P are allowed to participate. Thus without loss of generality, we may interpret all the broadcasts steps in our sub-protocols as the broadcast to the restricted set P .
Information Checking
Information Checking (IC) and IC Signatures [11, 22] : IC is an information theoretically secure method for authenticating data and is used to generate IC signatures. When a player IN T ∈ P receives an IC signature from a dealer D ∈ P on some secret value(s) S, then IN T can later produce the signature and have the players in P verify that it is in fact a valid signature of D on S. An IC scheme consists of a sequence of three protocols: We now describe an IC protocol which is a slight modification of the IC protocol described in [11] .
The protocol allows D to sign on a single field element s ∈ F (i.e. = 1; S = s). In the protocol, Distr takes single round (Round 1), AuthVal takes threes rounds (Round 2, 3 and Round 4), while RevealVal takes two rounds (Round 1 and Round 2). The protocol is given in Table 1 . Before describing the protocol, we recall the following definition from [11] . 
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of the properties of generalized IC protocol of [11] (see Lemma 1, Page 318-319).
2
Corresponding to each receiver Pi ∈ P , D chooses a random value αi ∈ F − {0, 1} and additional random values y i , z i ∈ F, such that the three tuple (s, 
AuthVal(D, IN T, P , s): Round 2: IN T randomly selects n random elements
d i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n from F − {0} and broadcasts the tuples (di, s i + dis, y i + diyi).
Round 3: In response to IN T 's broadcast in Round 2, D checks the correctness of the broadcasted information and also checks whether (s
if he finds any inconsistency. Each P i ∈ P accordingly adjusts his verification information (αi, zi), such that (s, yi, zi) is 1α i -consistent and the protocol ends here. Parallely, 
Otherwise the signature is "invalid". We now present an IC protocol, called EfficientIC, which allows D to sign on an length secret S ∈ F simultaneously, with ≥ 1, by communicating O(( + n)κ) bits and broadcasting
The idea of this protocol is taken from [20] . The protocol EfficientIC is given in Table 2 .
Lemma 2 Protocol EfficientIC correctly generates IC signature on field elements (each of size κ bits) at once by communicating O(( + n)κ) bits and broadcasting O(( + n)κ) bits. The protocol satisfies the properties of IC signature with an error probability of at most 2 −O(κ) .
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of the IC protocol given in [20] and hence is omitted. 2 Linearity of Protocol IC and EfficientIC: Protocol IC and EfficientIC satisfies the linearity property as specified by the following lemmas: 1 s (1,1) +r 2 s (2,1) ,1) ,s (1, 2) ...,s (1, ) ) (D, IN T ) and ICSig (s (2,1) ,s (2, 2) ...,s (2, ) ) (D, IN T ) and receivers can compute verification information corresponding to
over F, whose lower order coefficients are
is called authentication information, while for 1 ≤ i ≤ n , the values αi, vi and ri are called verification information.
If D finds any inconsistency, he broadcasts F (x). Parallely, receiver P i broadcasts "Accept" or "Reject", depending upon whether dv i + r i = B(α i ) or not.
Local Computation (by each player): if F (x) is broadcasted in Round 3 then accept the lower order coefficients of F (x) as D's secret and terminate. else construct an n length bit vector V Sh , where the j th , 1 ≤ j ≤ n bit is 1(0), if P j ∈ P has broadcasted "Accept" ("Reject") during Round 3. The vector V Sh is public, as it is constructed using broadcasted information. If V Sh does not contain n − t 1's, then D fails to give any signature to IN T and IC protocol terminates here.
, where ⊗ denotes bit wise AND. Since broadcasted information is public, each player (honest) will compute the same vectors V Notice that when a secret s is t -2D (+) -shared, then s is also t -1D-Shared and t -2D-shared by default. Hence t -2D (+) -sharing is the strongest sharings among t -1D-sharing, t -2D-sharing and t -2D (+) -sharing. In some sense, t -2D (+, ) -sharing is the extension of t -2D (+) -sharing for secrets. If a dealer D∈ P is honest, then he will always correctly t -1D-share/t -2D-share/t -2D (+) -share a secret s. Among these three types of sharings, t -2D (+) -sharing of a secret s allows efficient reconstruction of the secret with n players. However, a corrupted D may perform sharing in an incorrect way. To achieve parallelism, in the sequel, we describe a protocol called 2D (+, ) Share which allows a dealer D∈ P to verifiably t -2D (+, ) -share ≥ 1 length secret [s (1) , s (2) , . . . , s ( ) ]. Verifiably t -2D (+, ) -sharing ensures correct t -2D (+, ) -sharing even for a corrupted D. The protocol 2D (+, ) Share is given in Table 3 . The goal of the protocol is as follows: (a) If D is honest then he correctly generates t -2D (+, ) -sharing of the secret [s (1) , s (2) , . . . , s ( ) ], such that all the honest players publicly verify that D has correctly generated the sharing. Also when D is honest, then the secret will be information theoretically secure from the adversary A t . (b) If D is corrupted and has not generated correct t -2D (+, ) -sharing, then with very high probability, everybody will detect it and protocol will terminate. The idea of the protocol is taken from [11] , but instead of using the IC protocol of [11] , we employ the EfficientIC protocol proposed in this paper, which provides us with higher efficiency.
Lemma 5
In protocol 2D (+, ) Share, D generates correct t -2D (+, ) -sharing of field elements (each of size κ bits), with overwhelming probability. 2D (+, ) Share is a ten round protocol which communicates O(( n 2 + n 3 )κ) bits and broadcasts O(( n 2 + n 3 )κ) bits. 
for every player P j ∈ P , with very high probability (from the properties of our EfficientIC protocol). Hence it is clear that D has generated correct t -2D (+, ) -sharing of length secret with very probability. Round complexity of 2D (+, ) Share is easy to verify. Since in sum at most 4(n ) 2 instances of EfficientDistr and EfficientAuthVal of Protocol EfficientIC are executed, Protocol 2D (+, ) Share communicates and broadcasts O(( n 2 + n 3 )κ) bits. and b (1) , . . . , b ( ) t , the players in P can compute c (1) , . . . , c ( ) t where for l = 1, . . . , , c (l) =  F(a (l) , b (l) ) and F denotes any linear combination. This is due to the linearity property of our EfficientIC protocol presented in subsection 2.1. 
For l = 1, . . . , player P i checks whether the two sets f
If the values are not t -consistent, for some l ∈ {1, . . . , } then Pi along with all players in
If the signatures produced by Pi are valid and for some l ∈ {1, . . . , } either one of the two sets f
is not t -consistent, then the protocol terminates here without generating the desired output.
3. For every pair of players Pi and Pj from P the following will be executed: (a) Ideally for Pi and Pj the following should hold: f
. , . Pi as a dealer executes EfficientDistr and EfficientAuthVal of EfficientIC(P
to give his IC signature on f 
(b) If P j fails to produce valid signature in the previous step, then all the players from P ignore the IC signatures received from P j in previous step. Otherwise, if P j is able to produce valid signature then g
j (i), . . . , g ( ) j (i) become public. Using the public values P i checks whether f
. , . If he finds any inconsistency, then Pi along with all players in P invoke
. (c) If P i fails to produce valid signature in the previous step, then all the players from P ignore the IC signatures received from P i in step 3(a). Otherwise, if P i is able to produce valid signature, then all the values
j (i) for some l ∈ {1, . . . , } then the protocol terminates here without generating the desired output. Conversion From a t -2D (+, ) -sharing to t -2D + -sharings: Given t -2D (+, ) -sharing of secrets, we present a protocol Convert2D (+, ) to2D + which converts the t -2D (+, ) -sharing of the secrets to t -2D + -sharings of the individual secrets. Thus given s (1) , s (2) , . . . , s ( ) t , Convert2D (+, ) to2D + produces s (l) t for l = 1, . . . , . Note that s (1) , s (2) , . . . , s ( ) t could have been generated directly by Protocol 2D (+, ) Share or it could be linear combination of a number of t -2D (+, ) -sharings generated by different instances of Protocol 2D (+, ) Share. Reconstruction of a t -2D + -shared secret: Let s t be a t -2D + -sharing, which is shared using the polynomials H(x, y), f i (x), g i (y), 1 ≤ i ≤ n among the players in P . We may assume s t as one of the outcomes of Protocol Convert2D (+, ) to2D + . We now present a protocol 2D + Recons which allows the (honest) players to correctly recover s with very high probability. 
t is generated using 2D (+, ) Share, it implies that either P j already holds a combined signature on f
or it may also happen that every player from P has ignored Pi's signature. In the later case, players in P will again ignore P i 's signature. Otherwise P j can now check if P i has given signature on the same individual values.
Upon receiving the signatures on sayf
(1)
If there is inconsistency for some l ∈ {1, . . . , } then P j along with all players in P invoke EfficientRevealVal(Pi, Pj, P , , f
3. In the previous step, if P j is not able to produce the signature that he received from P i , then all the players from P ignore the IC signatures received from Pj during step 1. Otherwise if the signatures are valid then f
If the test fails for some l, then all the players in P ignore the values received from P i during first step. Otherwise the signature produced by Pj will be ignored by all the players in P .
For all Pj ∈ P such that Pj's IC signatures are not ignored by the players in P , player Pi sends ICSig f j (i) (Pj, Pi) to every player P k in P . Player P k ∈ P checks the validity of ICSig f j (i) (P j , P i ) with respect to his own verification information. If the verification passes then P k accepts ICSig f j (i) (P j , P i ). Now if for all P j ∈ P , P k accepts ICSig f j (i) (Pj, Pi) (which he receives from Pi) then P k checks whether fj(i)s are t -consistent (ideally fj(i) = gi(j) for all P j ∈ P ; so f j (i)s will lie on t degree polynomial g i (y)). If yes then P k adds P i to his CORE set and let the t degree polynomial (on which fj(i)s lie on) be gi(y). Player P k takes all the gi(y) polynomials corresponding to the players in his CORE and interpolates the bivariate polynomial H(x, y) and finally sets the secret s = H(0, 0). It is easy to check that all honest players from P recovers the same secret s.
Lemma 7 Protocol 2D + Recons takes one round and privately communicates O(n 3 κ) bits.
Generating Random t -2D
(+, )
-Sharing
We now present protocol Random(P , t , ) which allows the players in P to jointly generate a random t -2D (+, ) -sharing, r (1) , . . . , r ( ) t , where each r (l) is a random element from F.
t , where r (1,P i ) , . . . , r ( ,P i ) are randomly selected from F. Let P ass denotes the set of players P i in P such that t -2D (+, ) Share(Pi, P , t , , r (1,P i ) , . . . , r ( ,P i ) ) is executed successfully. Now all the players in P jointly computes r (1) , . . . , r
Lemma 8 With overwhelming probability, protocol Random generates a random t -2D (+, ) -sharing r (1) , . . . , r ( ) t in eight rounds and privately communicates and broadcasts O(( n 3 + n 4 )κ) bits. 
Proving c = ab
Every player P i ∈ P holds shares s 
We denote the t -1D (+, ) -sharing of length secret by s 1 , . . . , s (1) , b (1) ), . . . , (a ( ) , b ( ) ) such that D has already correctly t -1D (+, ) -shared a (1) , . . . , a ( ) and b (1) , . . . , b ( ) among the players in P . Now D wants to correctly t -2D (+, ) -share c (1) , . . . , c ( ) without leaking any additional information about a (l) , b (l) and c (l) , such that every (honest) player in P knows that c (l) = a (l) b (l) for l = 1, . . . , . We propose a protocol ProveCeqAB to achieve this task. The idea of the protocol is inspired from [11] with the following modification: we make use of our protocol 2D (+, ) -Share, which provides us with high efficiency.
We try to explain the idea of the protocol with a single pair (a, b) . Thus D has already t -1D (+) -shared a and b using polynomials, say f a (x) and f b (x). Now he wants to generate t -2D (+) -sharing of c, where c = ab, without leaking any additional information about a, b and c. For this, he first selects a random non-zero β ∈ F and generates t -2D (+) -sharing of c, β and βb. Let f c (x), f β (x) and f βb (x) are polynomials implicitly used for sharing c, β and βb. All the players in P then jointly generate a random value r. D then broadcasts the polynomial F 1 (x) = rf a (x) + f β (x). Every player locally checks whether the appropriate linear combination of his shares lies on the broadcasted polynomial F 1 (x). If it does not then the player broadcasts D's signature on the shares of a and β. If the signature is valid and indeed the player's value does not lie on F 1 (x), then all the players will conclude that D fails to prove c = ab.
Otherwise, D again broadcasts
As before every players locally checks whether the appropriate linear combination of his shares lies on the broadcasted polynomial The error probability of the protocol is negligible because of the random r which is jointly generated by all the players. Specifically, a corrupted D might have shared β = β, βb = βb or c = c but still F 2 (0) can be zero and this will happen iff f βb (x) + rf c (x) = f βb (x) + rf c (x). However this equation is satisfied by only one value of r. Since r is randomly generated, independent of D, the probability that the equality will hold is 1 |F| which is negligibly small. Now we can extend the above idea parallely for each of the pairs (a (l) , b (l) ). The secrecy follows from the fact that the broadcasted polynomials F 1 (x) and F 2 (x) are randomly distributed with the constant coefficient of F 2 (x) as zero. 
2. Now all the players in P jointly generate a random number r. This is done as follows: first the players in P execute the protocol Random(P , t , 1) to generate r t . Then the players compute r = 2D + Recons(P , t , r t ).
3. Now D broadcasts the polynomials
4.
Player P i ∈ P checks whether F (l) (i)
If the test fails for at least one l, then Pi and all players invoke EfficientRevealVal(D, Pi, P , , f 5. Now D broadcasts the polynomials
6. Player P i ∈ P checks whether G (l) (i) 2t + 1 of the n t -2D (+) -shared values e 1 t , . . . , e n t ). The reason is that any 2t degree polynomial needs at least 2t + 1 points for its interpolation. So if t = t and n = 2t + 1, then c can not be computed even if at least one player fails to t -2D (+) -share his e value. In general, to fail Protocol Mult at least n − (2t + 1) + 1 = n − 2t players must fail to t -2D (+) -share their corresponding e values. All such players will be removed from P and will be added to C. 
If at least n − 2t players fails in executing ProveCeqAB, then remove them from P , adjust t and terminate the protocol without generating the expected result. Otherwise for simplicity assume that the first 2t + 1 players are successful in executing ProveCeqAB.
4. All the players compute: c (1) , . . . , c 
Proving a=b
Consider the following scenario: Let D∈ P has t -1D (+, ) -shared values a (1) , . . . , a ( ) among the players in P . Now some more computation has been carried out after the sharing done by D and during the computation some players have been detected as faulty and removed from P . Let us denote the snapshot of P before and after the computation by P 1 and P 2 respectively. Also assume |P 1 | = n 1 and the number of corrupted players in P 1 is t 1 with n 1 ≥ t + 1 + t 1 . Similarly |P 2 | = n 2 and the number of corrupted players in P 2 is t 2 with n 2 ≥ t + 1 + t 2 , t 1 > t 2 . Now D wants to correctly t 2 -2D (+, ) -share b (1) , . . . , b ( ) among the players of P 2 such that b (l) = a (l) , without leaking any additional information about a (l) . We propose a protocol ProveAeqB to achieve this task. We try to explain the idea of the protocol with a single value a. D has already t 1 -1D (+) -shared a among the players in P 1 by implicitly using polynomial say f a (x). Now he wants to t 2 -2D (+) -share a among the players in P 2 . For this, he first generates t 2 -2D (+) -sharing of b with b = a. Let f b (x) be the polynomial implicitly used for sharing b. D then selects a random element c ∈ F and (t 1 − 1)-2D (+) -shares c among the players in P 2 . Let f c (x) be the polynomial implicitly used for sharing c. Now to prove that f a (x) and f b (x) share the same value a, D broadcasts the polynomial 
Resharing
As described in previous section, consider the time-stamps before and after some computation where before and after the computation, P is denoted by P 1 and P 2 respectively. Let the players in P 1 holds a t 1 -2D (+, ) -sharing of values s (1) , . . . , s ( ) secret multiplication triples will be generated, where t 1 denotes the number of corrupted players present in P (t 1 = t − |C|) at the beginning of the segment's execution; (b) the segment fails with at least 2 f corrupted players being eliminated from P (and added to C), where f denotes the number of failures occurred so far. But there are two problems here. We want all the triples to be d-2D + -shared. But since the number of corrupted players in P may change dynamically after every failure, the sharings produced in different segment may be of different degree. Also the sharing produced by segments are t 1 -2D (+, ) -sharings where t 1 may vary segment to segment. So, to achieve our goal, we first use protocol Reshare to obtain uniform d-2D ( c I = n i=1 c i . We stress that though some players from P might have failed and removed during preparation phase, we still allow them to feed their input. Recall that at the end of preparation phase, P 2 = P . So once all the players in P feed their input, the rest of the computation will be performed among the players in P 2 . For this, each input sharing is then reshared among the players in P 2 . Also if some player P i fails to correctly share their input, then everybody accepts a default d − 2D (+,c i ) sharing on behalf of that player.
Input Phase 1. Every player P i ∈ P with c i inputs s (1) i , s (2) 
Computation Phase
Once Preparation Phase and Input Phase are over, the computation of the circuit (of the agreed upon function f ) proceeds gate-by-gate. First, to every random and every multiplication gate, a prepared d-2D + -shared random triple is assigned. And a d-2D + -shared input is assigned to the corresponding input gates. A gate (except output gate) g is said to be computed if a d-2D + -sharings x g d is computed for the gate. Note that all the random and input gates will be computed as soon as we assign d-2D + -shared random triples (generated in Preparation Phase) and d-2D + -shared inputs (generated in Input Phase) to them respectively. A gate is said to be in ready state, when all its fanin gates have been computed. In the Computation Phase, the circuit evaluation proceeds in rounds wherein each round all the ready gates will be computed parallely. Evaluation of input, random and addition gates do not require any communication. Evaluation of multiplication and output gate requires 2 and 1 call to Protocol 2D + Recons respectively. So the individual gates in the circuit are evaluated as shown in the table given in the sequel.
The correctness of the steps described for multiplication gate follows from [1] which introduced the technique called Circuit Randomization. So the Circuit Randomization [1] allows to evaluate a multiplication gate at the cost of two public reconstructions, given a preprocessed random multiplication triple. The trick is as follows: Let z = xy. Now z can be expressed as z = ((x − a) + a) ( 
